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III. REPLY ARGUMENT 
A. FERC REGULATIONS AND RULINGS, AND IDAHO DEFERENCE. 
1. Cherry-Picking FERC Orders. Both Idaho Power's and the Commission's 
brief contain numerous citations to FERC Orders that they rely on. Examples include: (i) "It is 
up to the states, not FERC, to determine the specific parameters of individual QF power purchase 
Agreements, including the date at which a legally enforceable obligation is incurred" (Idaho 
PUC relying on FERC's West Penn1 and Jersey Central2 decisions, and Idaho Power relying on 
West Penn) 3; (ii) "The application of this [PURP A implementation] framework conforms with 
FERC's analysis of its own standards" (Idaho PUC relying on FERC's JD Wind 14 decision) 5; 
(iii) QF projects larger than a state established eligibility cap for published avoided cost rates are 
to be "individually negotiated by the QF" (Idaho PUC citing FERC's decision in Southern Cal 
Edison, San Diego Gas & Electric6); and (iv) "[A] QF, by committing itself to sell to an electric 
utility, also commits the electric utility to buy from the QF; these commitment result either in 
contracts or in non-contractual, but binding, legally enforceable obligation: (Idaho Power relying 
on FERC's Grouse Creek Wind decision, which in tum was quoting FERC's JD Wind I Order\ 
2 
4 
West Penn Power Co., 71FERC,61,153 (1995). 
Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 73 FERC, 61,092 ( 1995). 
Idaho PUC Brief at p. 21, Idaho Power Brief at p. 16. 
JD Wind I, 129 FERC, 61,148 at 61,663 (2009). 
Idaho PUC Brief at p. 22. 
6 Idaho PUC Brief at p. 33, citing Southern Cal Edison Co., San Diego Gas & Electric, 71 FERC, 
61,269 at 62, 079-62-080 ( 1995). 
Idaho Power Brief, p. 24, citing Grouse Creek Wind, 142 FERC , 61, 187 at P 40(2013) and JD 
Wind I, LLC 129 FERC, 61,148 at 61,663 (2009). 
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In spite of the Idaho PU C's and Idaho Power's reliance on various FERC decisions 
throughout their briefs, they both have a different recommendation with respect to FERC's 
decision in Grouse Creek. 8 The Commission argues that FERC's Grouse Creek decision is "of 
no legal moment" unless and until sanctioned by a Federal District Court, carrying no more 
weight than a legal memorandum.9 Idaho Power goes a step further, arguing that FERC was 
"acting outside its jurisdiction and authority" when it decided Grouse Creek. 10 
By their own actions -- of asking this court to rely on various FERC Declaratory Orders, 
when it serves their purpose -- Idaho Power and the Idaho PUC impeach their own arguments 
that this Court should ignore the single most relevant FERC decision as it relates to Grouse 
Creek. 
2. Agency Interpretations of Their Own Rules are Afforded Judicial Deference. 
The Idaho PUC's and Idaho Power's recommendation that this Court should afford no weight to 
FERC's Orders in Cedar Creek11, Rainbow Ranch12, Murphy Flat13 and, in particular, Grouse 
Creek14 is contrary to the well-established principal that Courts are to afford great deference to 
an Agency's interpretation of its own rules. As the U.S. Supreme Court said in Chevron v. 
NRDC, "We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive 
department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of 
9 
10 
ll 
12 
13 
14 
Grouse Creek Wind Park, LLC, et. al., 142 FERC ~ 61,187 (2013). 
Idaho PUC Brief, pp. 35, 36. 
Idaho Power Brief, p. 20. 
Cedar Creek Wind LLC, 137 FERC ~ 61,006 (2011). 
Rainbow Ranch Wind, LLC and Rainbow West Wind, LLC, 139 FERC ~ 61,007 (2012). 
Murphy Flat Power, LLC, 141FERC~61,145 (2012). 
142 FERC ~ 61,187. 
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deference to administrative interpretations."15 While federal agencies are accorded considerable 
deference in interpreting a statute itself, courts grant even greater deference to a federal agency 
where, as in this case, the agency is interpreting its own regulations implementing the statute. 
FERC' s interpretation and application of its own regulations and orders are entitled to the highest 
standard of deference allowed by law. See Auer v. Robbins (administrative agencies' 
interpretations of their own regulations are controlling unless "plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation") 16; see also Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. ("[T]he ultimate criterion 
is the administrative interpretation, which becomes controlling weight unless it is plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation")17; and Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition, et 
al. v. Aracoma Coal Company, et al., (affirming the Auer and Seminole Rock deference rules, 
that the court's review of the agency action was "highly deferential, with the agency's 
interpretation 'controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with regulation"'). 18 Most 
recently, the Supreme Court has explained, "It is well established that an agency's interpretation 
need not be the only possible reading of a regulation-or even the best one-to prevail."19 
FERC's Cedar Creek, Rainbow Ranch, Murphy Flat and Grouse Creek orders directly 
interpreted the meaning of FERC's rule regarding legally enforceable obligations, codified by 
15 
16 
17 
Chevron US.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782 (1984). 
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461, 117 S.Ct. 905 (1997). 
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 1217 (1945). 
18 Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition, et al. v. Aracoma Coal Company, et al., 556 F.3d 177, 
193- 194 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). 
19 Decker v. Northwest Envir. Defense Center, 568 U.S. __ ,_, Slip Opinion at 14 (March 20, 
2013) 
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FERC at 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2)(ii),20 and concluded that the Idaho PUC's "bright line" rule 
and "effective date" rule are violations of PURP A's rule for establishing legally enforceable 
obligations. FERC's conclusions are entirely consistent with the regulation because, on its face, 
the regulation allows a QF to provide energy and capacity "pursuant to a legally enforceable 
obligation" containing "avoided costs calculated at the time the obligation is incurred."21 The 
Idaho PUC's focus on a final written contract and Idaho Power's unilaterally declared "effective 
date" finds no support in this regulation, and cannot overcome the highly deferential weight to be 
accorded to FERC' s interpretation of its own regulation. 
It is without merit for the Idaho PUC to claim that FERC misinterpreted the 
Commission's prior orders22 , or that FERC's West Penn and JD Wind I orders issued prior to 
Cedar Creek, Rainbow Ranch, Murphy Flat and Grouse Creek are more pertinent and 
controlling when FERC has directly and recently said that the Idaho PUC violated PURP A in 
denying the Grouse Creek PP As. Likewise, it is meritless for Idaho Power to suggest to this 
Court that FERC's Grouse Creek Order is "legally ineffectual."23 These arguments simply swim 
against the heavy current of well-established law, that a Court gives great deference to an 
agency's interpretation of its own rules. 
20 See also Small Power Production and Cogeneration Facilities; Regulations Implementing Section 
210 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 45 Fed. Reg. 12,214, 12,224 (Feb. 25, 1980) 
(containing FERC's order promulgating the LEO rule as it still exists today). 
21 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2)(ii). 
22 
"[T]he language in FERC's opinion puts into question whether FERC understood the basis upon 
which the Commission made its initial decision to disapprove the Agreements." Idaho PUC Brief at p. 36; 
"It is clear that FERC did not fully understand the underlying facts and law upon which the Commission's 
decision was based." Idaho PUC Brief at p. 38. 
23 Idaho Power Brief, p. 20. 
Appellant Grouse Creek's Reply Brief Page 9 
3. This Court Can Review and Enforce both PURPA Implementation and 
Application Errors of the Idaho PUC. Idaho Power attempts to use the distinction between 
PURP A "as-applied" claims and "as-implemented" claims as a basis to argue why this Court 
should ignore FERC's Grouse Creek decision. That argument is misplaced and easily dispatched. 
Congress enacted PURP A with a 3-step implementation process. First, FERC was to 
"prescribe ... such rules as it determines necessary to encourage cogeneration and small power 
production."24 Second, each "State regulatory authority shall, after notice and opportunity for 
public hearing, implement such rule for each electric utility."25 Finally, each state regulatory 
authority is to @illy PURP A by "determining the specific parameters of individual QF power 
purchase agreements."26 
FERC also gives the states latitude in how to implement PURP A, with Idaho choosing to 
do so on a case-by-case basis.27 However, it is because of the Idaho PU C's case-by-case 
implementation of PURP A, and how that implementation has been manipulated and revised by 
the Commission since November of 2010, that Idaho Power and the Idaho PUC fail to correctly 
distinguish between the "implementation," and the "application" of PURP A. 
Idaho Power's core argument is an attempt to recast Grouse Creek's appeal from a 
PURP A implementation ("as-implemented") case, into a PURP A application ("as-applied") case, 
with "as-applied" jurisdiction more properly before the Idaho PUC and this Court then before 
24 
25 
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a). 
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(f)(l). 
26 West Penn Power Co., 71 FERC if 61, 153 at 61495 ( 1995) (Idaho Power cites West Penn for the 
same proposition., see Idaho Power Brief at p. 16). 
27 Policy Statement Regarding the Commission's Enforcement Role Under Section 210 of the Public 
Utility regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 23 FERC if 61,304, p. 61,644. 
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FERC.28 As a consequence of this now allegedly being an "as applied" case [in Idaho Power's 
mind], Idaho Power then argues that this Court is free to ignore FERC's Grouse Creek, Cedar 
Creek Rainbow Ranch and Murphy Flat orders. Idaho Power and the Idaho PUC then both 
argue that the Commission properly applied PURP A in finding that Grouse Creek had failed to 
establish a legally enforceable obligation. 
What Idaho Power and the Commission fail to recognize is that ifthe Commission's 
implementation of PURP A is flawed, then any application of that flawed implementation of 
PURPA with respect to a particular QF must, by definition, also be in violation of PURPA. You 
simply cannot have a legal application of an illegal rule. It does not matter if that illegal 
application happens only once to a single QF (such as Grouse Creek), or a dozen times to 
multiple QFs. It is worth saying again - you simply cannot have a legal application [by the 
Commission] of a regulation that was illegally implemented. 
Idaho Power is also incorrect in its argument that this Court is barred from considering 
PURP A implementation claims. The PURP A federal statute explicitly establishes a dual path for 
PURPA implementation claims, with one of those paths being state court: "Judicial review may 
be obtained respecting any proceeding conducted by a state regulatory authority or nonregulated 
electric utility for purposes of implementing any requirement of a [PURP A] rule .. in the same 
manner, and under the same requirements, as judicial review may be obtained under section 2633 
of this title."29 Section 2633 of the Federal Power Act provides that "Any Person() may obtain 
28 
29 
Idaho Power Brief, p. 13. 
16 U.S.C. § 824a-(3)(g)(1). 
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review of any determination made under subchapter I or II30 with respect to any electric utility () 
in the appropriate State court."31 In that regard, Idaho Power misreads Power Resource Group, 
Inc. v. Public Utility Commission of Texas,32 when it cites Power Resource Group for the 
proposition that implementation claims are the "sole province and jurisdiction" of federal courts, 
not the state, and not FERC.33 The passage cited by Idaho Power in Power Resource Group is 
only in relation to the Federal Court of Appeals ruling that petitioner's "federal" PURPA 
implementation claim should have first been brought in Federal District Court and not in the 
Court of Appeals. More to the point, Power Resource Group also says "state courts will review 
the state rules promulgated to implement PURP A and its associated FERC Regulations." (citing 
16 U.S.C. § 824a-(3)(g)(l)-(2)).34 
Consequently, the question of whether the Idaho PUC properly implemented PURPA in 
its June 8, 2011, Grouse Creek Order No. 3225735 (establishing a "bright line rule" of dual 
executed contracts for PURP A legally enforceable obligations), or in it Remand Order of 
September 7, 201236 (where it supplanted the bright line rule with an effective date/meritorious 
complaint rule), are proper questions before this Court, as well as FERC. FERC has already 
ruled that both these rules are "inconsistent with" or "at odds with" PURP A."37 This court must 
30 
31 
PURPA is in subchapter II of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 et. seq. 
16 U.S.C. § 2633(c)(l) (emphasis added). 
32 422 F.3d 231, 235 (51h Cir., 2005) cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1020, 126 S.Ct. 1583, 164 L.Ed.2d 301 
(2006). 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
Idaho Power Brief, p. 19. 
422 F.2d at p. 235. 
R.p.221. 
Order No. 32635, R. p. 346. 
Cedar Creek, 137 FERC ii 61,006 at ii 35; Grouse Creek, 142 FERC ii 61,187 at ii 40. 
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give deference to those FERC decisions, in also determining that the Idaho PUC failed to 
implement PURP A in a manner consistent with its obligation to do so. 
The Idaho PUC, relying on Industrial Cogenerators v. FERC, 38 argues similarly that 
declaratory orders of FERC have "no legal moment" unless and until such an order is adopted by 
a district court. Such Reliance is misdirected however. In Niagara Mohawk v. FERC, the D.C. 
Court of Appeals restated its decision in Industrial Co generators v. FERC, by saying "In 
Industrial Cogenerators, we concluded that it would be fundamentally inconsistent with this 
enforcement scheme - indeed, would 'usurp the role of the district court as the court of first 
instance' for this court (the Court of Appeals) to review an order of [FERC] concerning the 
agency's interpretation of PURP A."39 
The Court of Appeals holdings in Niagara Mohawk and Industrial Co generators was that 
the parties were seeking to enforce FERC decisions in the 'wrong federal court' (i.e., the Court 
of Appeals), where instead, the U.S. District Court is the "court of first instance in the 
enforcement scheme created by [PURP A] § 210. "40 Thus, the Court ruled that "the court of 
appeals accordingly do not have pre-enforcement jurisdiction" over FERC's declaratory orders.41 
See also Xcel Energy Services, Inc. v. FERC., ("Under the PURP A's enforcement scheme, 
however, 'it is always the district court that first passes upon the merits of whatever position the 
Commission may take concerning the implementation of PURP A. (citations omitted))' 42" In 
fact, in these cases the Circuit Court expressly noted that normal standards of agency deference 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
Industrial Cogenerators v. FERC, 47 F.3d 1231, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp v. FERC, 117 F.3d 1485, 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
Id. 
Id. 
Xcel Energy Services, Inc. v. FERC, 407 F.3d 1242 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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would apply to FERC's order if- as is true with this appeal the matter were submitted to the 
correct court.43 Consequently, citations to this line of cases for the proposition that this Court 
is free to disregard FERC declaratory orders, "unless or until" they are adopted by a U. S. 
District Court, is a misapplication of these decisions. 
B. LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE OBLIGATIONS UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL 
LAW. 
1. Determining a PURPA Legally Enforceable Obligation is Not Exclusively a 
State Law Matter. The Idaho PUC argues that this Court's prior ruling in Rosebud Enterprises 
v. Idaho PUC (Rosebud 1) 44, along with FERC's decision in West Penn45 and West Penn's 
progeny, 46 give the Commission unfettered discretion in determining how and when PURP A 
legally enforceable obligations are established in Idaho.47 That is incorrect. 
While FERC gives deference to the states to determine the date on which a legally 
enforceable obligation is incurred, such deference is subject to the terms of, and must comply 
with, FERC's PURPA regulations. FERC specifically discarded the Idaho PUC's West Penn 
argument in Cedar Creek where it said: 
Idaho PUC and other protesters interpret West Penn's discussion to give 
broad discretion to the states as to what constitutes a legally enforceable 
obligation and when such obligation is incurred. We Disagree. While West 
Penn stands for the notion that the [FERC] gives deference to the states to 
determine the date on which a legally enforceable obligation is incurred, 
43 See Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 117 F .3d at 1488 ("Under the Administrative Procedure Act 
the district court must, of course, determine whether the Commission's interpretation of the statute is 
reasonable .... "). 
44 Rosebud Enterprises v. Idaho PUC (Rosebud I) 128 Idaho 609, 917 P .2d 7 66 ( 1996). 
45 West Penn, 71FERCii61,153. 
46 Jersey Central Power & Light, Co., 73 FERC ii 61,092; Metropolitan Edison Co. et. al., 72 FERC 
ii 61,015 (1995). 
47 Idaho PUC Brief, pp. 20-23. 
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such deference is subject to the terms of the Commission's regulations. West 
Penn does not, as the Idaho PUC argues, give states the unlimited discretion 
to limit the ways a legally enforceable obligation is incurred.48 
Similarly, in Grouse Creek, FERC stated: 
We recognize that "[it] is up to the States, not this Commission, to 
determine the specific parameters of individual QF power purchase 
agreements, including the date at which a legally enforceable obligation is 
incurred under state law.' [citation to West Penn]" Yet, we are within our 
authority to bring an enforcement action, as we will do here, to correct a 
state's misreading of the Commission's PURPA regulations and precedent.49 
The Idaho PUC also cites Rosebud I for things that it is not. First, Rosebud I is replete 
with references and deference by this Court to FERC rules and decisions. In that regard, just as 
this Court relied on FERC's 1995 West Penn decision in its 1996 Rosebud I decision, this Court 
should also, in 2013, defer to FERC's 2011 through 2013 decisions in Cedar Creek, Rainbow 
Ranch, Murphy Flat and Grouse Creek. These very recent decisions further defined limitations 
on the deference FERC gives to States in implementing legally enforceable obligation standards. 
Yet, the Idaho PUC wrongly continues to cite a FERC decision from 17 years ago for something 
FERC has very recently said it is not. 
It is also misleading that the Idaho PUC's brief suggests that Idaho law holds that: "It is 
up to the states"50 to determine legally enforceable obligation standards under PURP A. Omitted 
from the Commission's quotation from Rosebud I is the introductory phrase to that quote, which 
is: "According to the FERC (it is up to the states ... )"51 In essence, what this Court was really 
48 
49 
50 
51 
Cedar Creek, 137 FERC if 61,006 at if 35 (emphasis added). 
Grouse Creek, 142 FERC if 61, 187 at if 41 (emphasis added). 
Idaho PUC Brief, p. 21. 
Rosebud I, 128 Idaho 623, 917 P.2d 781. 
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saying was that it was simply following FERC's lead, when judging the Commission's 
interpretation of PURP A rules and precedent. 
2. The Commission's Requirement of either a Signed Contract or a Meritorious 
Complaint is a Violation of PURPA. The Idaho PUC argues that it has a long and unbroken 
history of determining the existence of a PURP A legally enforceable obligation, by application 
of the "signed contract" or "meritorious complaint" rule. 52 Grouse Creek's initial brief in this 
case refutes the notion that the "meritorious complaint" requirement has been applied 
consistently, or at all, and how it was, in effect, abandoned in 2005 for a more reasoned analysis 
of determining a legally enforceable obligation. That argument will not be repeated here. Nor 
does Grouse Creek dispute that the contract-or-complaint rule was reinstated by the Commission 
in its Order on Remand in this case. 53 Grouse Creek does dispute the manner in which the rule 
was reinstated and that such rule is an illegal implementation of PURPA. 
The Idaho PUC asserts that a QF does not become eligible for an avoided cost rate until 
either a PPA is signed or a meritorious complaint is filed, and "[i]f a contract is entered into, then 
the agreement itselfreflects the legally enforceable obligations between the parties."54 Contrary 
to these assertions, there are numerous Commission decisions, cited by Grouse Creek it is 
opening brief, where the Commission has approved PP As for projects that were signed after the 
effective date of an avoided cost downward rate change, and where no complaint was filed. 55 
52 
53 
54 
55 
Idaho PUC Brief, pp. 21-23. 
IPUC Order No. 32635, R. p. 346, et. seq. 
Idaho PUC Brief, p. 22. 
IPUC Order No. 29951at2, (January 2008) In the Matter of. .. Salmon Falls Wind Park LLC. 
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Even more telling, while this case was on Remand from this Court, the Commission 
issued a remand order approving the Cedar Creek PP As, containing the same published avoided 
cost rates at issue in this case, but which contained an "effective date" which was also well after 
the December 14, 2010, cut-of date. 56 Nor had Cedar Creek filed a complaint at the Idaho 
Commission against Rocky Mountain Power. Yet, in spite of Cedar Creek lacking either a PP A 
signed or containing an "effective date" before December 14, 2010, or a filed complaint, the 
Idaho PUC said: [W]e find that the record reveals that Cedar Creek had perfected a legally 
enforceable obligation no later than December 13, 2010. As such, Cedar Creek was entitled to 
the published avoided cost rates available to 10 aMW QFs in effect as of December 13, 2010."57 
Moreover, the Commission approved major modifications to the project locations and other 
commercial terms of the initial Cedar Creek PP As - further undercutting the notion that the 
Commission's precedent requires that every word a PP A must be fully settled, prior to creation 
of a legally enforceable obligation under PURP A. 58 
IPUC Order No. 32024 at 3, (July 2010) In the Matter of . .. Cargill Incorporated. 
IPUC Order No. 32104 at 11-12, (November 2010) In the Matter of. .. Yellowstone Power Inc. 
56 
"The Firm Energy Sales Agreements between Rocky Mountain Power and the five projects were 
executed on December 22, 2010." In the Matter of. .. Cedar Creek Wind, IPUC Order No. 32260 (June 
8, 2011), p. 10. 
57 In the Matter of. .. Cedar Creek Wind, IPUC Order No. 32419 (December 2011 ), p. 9 (emphasis 
added). 
58 Id., at 6-7. 
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The Idaho PUC argues that its contract-or-complaint rule is a valid "application [that] 
confirms with FERC's analysis of its own standards"59 (emphasis added), relying on FERC's 
JD Wind 160 decision. This reliance is misplaced. In Cedar Creek FERC said: 
We disagree with the Idaho PUC and find our discussion of PURPA in JD 
Wind I particularly applicable, that the phrase legally enforceable obligation is 
broader than simply a contract between an electric utility and a QF, and that the 
phrase is used to prevent an electric utility from avoided its PURP A obligations 
by refusing to sign a contract, or as here, from delaying the signing of a 
contract, so that the latter and lower avoided cost rate is applicable. We further 
find that the Idaho PUC's June 8 Order ignores the fact that a legally 
enforceable obligation may be incurred before the formal memorialization of a 
contract to writing." 
As a consequence of this holding by FERC in Cedar Creek, the Idaho PUC, in its Order 
No. 32635 on Remand in this case, reinstated its contract-or-complaint rule (with a new and 
heavy emphasis placed on "meritorious") and found Grouse Creek non-compliant with the rule.61 
However, FERC, in its Grouse Creek Order, also invalidated this reinstated contract-or-
complaint rule , when it said: 
The Idaho Commissions requirement that a OF formally complain 
"meritorious[ly]" to the Idaho Commission before obtaining a legally 
enforceable obligation would both unreasonably interfere with a QF's right to a 
legally enforceable obligation (citation to JD Wind I) and also create practical 
disincentives to amicable contract formation. Such obstacles to QFs are at odds 
with the Commission's regulations implementing PURPA. They are not 
reasonable conditions for a state PURP A process. 62 
FERC clearly articulates that the Idaho PUC's complaint-or-contract rule is an 
unreasonable and illegal condition for establishment of a legally enforceable obligation. For the 
59 
60 
61 
62 
Idaho PUC Brief, p. 22. 
JD Wind 1, 129 FERC ii61,148 at 61,633 (2009). 
IPUC Order No. 32635, R. p. 346. 
Grouse Creek, 142 FERC ii 61,187 at ii 40. 
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reasons discussed above, this Court should afford FERC' s interpretation of its own regulations 
the highest standard of deference and reverse the Commission's rejection of the Grouse Creek 
PP As on this basis. 
C. STATE LAW ERRORS IN DENYING THE GROUSE CREEK PP As. 
In essence, the Commission suggests that great changes occurred when the illegal (as 
declared by FERC) June 8 execution date "bright line" rule 63 was converted into an effective 
date rule, with a meritorious complaint alternative rule appended. Besides being a PURP A 
violation, this two-pronged test was implemented contrary to established state law. 
1. The Commission's Effective Date Tests Fails PURPA's Requirement for 
Reasoned Analysis of Legally Enforceable Obligations. The Idaho PUC asserts that "[i]f a 
contract is entered into, then the agreement itself reflects the legally enforceable obligations 
between the parties."64 FERC disagrees: "[A] legally enforceable obligation includes, but is not 
limited to, a contract."65 FERC goes on to say: "Therefore, when a state limits the methods 
through which a legally enforceable obligation may be created to only a fully executed contract, 
the state's limitation is inconsistent with PURP A."66 The Idaho PU C's revision of its mechanical 
"fully executed" rule to an equally mechanical "effective date" rule is similarly "inconsistent 
with PURP A."67 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
IPUC Order No. 32257, R. p. 221. 
Id., p. 22. 
Cedar Creek, 137 FERC ~ 61,006 at~ 35. 
Id. 
Id. 
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It should also be noted that Grouse Creek cited controlling state and federal law as to 
formation of legally binding contracts prior to formal memorialization by a writing. 68 Neither 
the Idaho PUC nor Idaho Power addressed, outside of PURPA's legally enforceable obligation 
rules, Grouse Creek's assertion that, under state law, Grouse Creek and Idaho Power had come to 
an agreement as to the material terms and conditions of the PPAs. 
2. The Grouse Creek PP As are not Clear and Unambiguous. The Idaho PUC 
places great weight on the argument that because the Grouse Creek PP As were "clear and 
unambiguous"69 in stating the contract effective date of December 28, 2010, the Commission had 
no alternative other than to enforce the terms agreed to between the parties. 70 The Commission's 
'integration clause' argument is essentially just a corollary of the 'clear and unambiguous' 
argument. The error the Commission makes in this analysis is in only looking at one or two71 
phrases in the PP As, instead of looking at the Agreements as a whole. 
A contract term is ambiguous when there are two different reasonable interpretations or 
the language is nonsensical.72 In determining patent ambiguity, the contract as a whole is 
considered. 73 A latent ambiguity is not evident on the face of the instrument alone, but becomes 
68 Evco Sound & Electronics, Inc. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 148 Idaho 357, 365, 223 P.3d 740, 748 (2009); 
Miller Const. Co. v. Stresstek, 108 Idaho 187, 188-89; 697 P.2d 1201, 1202-04 (1985); First Nat'! Mortgage Co. v. 
Fed. Realty Inv. Trust, 631 F.3d I 058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2011 ); Snow Mt. Pine Co. v. Maudlin, 84 Or. App. 590, 599, 
734 P.2d 1366, 1370 (1987). 
69 
70 
71 
72 
Idaho PUC Brief, p. 23. 
Id., pp. 23-26. 
(i.e., the integration clause is the second instance). 
Swanson v. Beco Constr. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 62, 175 P.3d 748, 751 (2007). 
73 Buku Properties v. Clark, 153 Idaho 828, 291 P.3d 1027, 102 (2012), citing Pinehaven Planning 
Bd v. Brooks, 138 Idaho 826, 829, 70 P.3d 664, 667 (2003). 
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apparent when applying the instrument to the facts as they exist. 74 Courts are to review the 
agreement as a whole, in determining whether a covenant or agreement is ambiguous. 75 
The Grouse Creek PP As do not unambiguously compel a conclusion that the "effective 
date" ascribed by Idaho Power on page 1 of those Agreements somehow nullifies the remainder 
of the Agreements. The most material part of the Grouse Creek PP As is the price, or rate, to 
which Grouse Creek is entitled. The date of this entitlement is the very essence of this case 
before this Court. In that context, Idaho Power signed the Grouse Creek Agreements on 
December 28, 2010, containing rates (or prices) Grouse Creek was only entitled to before 
December 14, 2010. Idaho Power's very signing of the Grouse Creek PPAs on December 28, 
2010, is an acknowledgement that the effective date of the Grouse Creek PPAs was "no later 
than December 13, 2010."76 Alternatively, ifldaho Power believed that Grouse Creek was not 
entitled to PP As containing rates that were only effective on or before December 14, 2010, it 
should have refused to provide Grouse Creek with execution ready copies of the PPAs on 
December 15, 2010, or refused to sign the PPAs on December 28, 2010. 
In judging the PPAs "as a whole," it is clear that the patent ambiguity between pre-
December 14, 2010, avoided cost rates embodies in the PP As, and the notational date of 
December 28, 2010, which was inserted by Idaho, must be resolved in favor of Grouse Creek 
74 Williams v. Idaho Potato Starch Co., 73 Idaho 13, 20, 245 P.2d 1045, 1049 (1952); see also In re 
Estate of Kirk, 12 7 Idaho 817, 824, 907 P .2d 794, 80 l (1995). 
75 Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189, 192, 923 P.2d 434, 437 (1996). 
76 [W]e find that the record reveals that Cedar Creek had perfected a legally enforceable obligation 
no later than December 13, 2010. As such, Cedar Creek was entitled to the published avoided cost rates 
available to l 0 aMW QFs in effect as of December 13, 20 l O." Cedar Creek Wind, IPUC Order No. 
32419, p. 9. 
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and against Idaho Power, who controlled all the drafting of the PPAs. 77 The latent ambiguity of 
the effective date of the PP As is similarly established by Idaho Power's act of signing, on 
December 28, 2010: i.e., one can only assume that Idaho Power signed because Grouse Creek 
had established its legal right to those rates on or before December 14, 2010. 
3. The Idaho PUC is not free to Disregard Evidence, in Making Findings of 
Fact. In rejecting the Grouse Creek Agreements on Reconsideration, the Commission held that 
"A determination regarding whether and when a legally enforceable obligation arose - outside 
the specific contract terms - was wholly unnecessary."78 The Idaho PUC defends this decision 
on the basis that "The Commission did not attribute any weight to these issues because they are 
not appropriate in the context of a proceeding where a negotiated contract is submitted for the 
Commission's review and approval."79 
In response, it must be noted that the Idaho PUC is not empowered under Idaho law to 
refuse to "attribute any weight," without explanation, to credible facts raised before it in an 
administrative proceeding. If true, any appeal of Commission action to this Court would be 
rendered meaningless. Instead, the standard established by this Court, as extensively noted by 
Grouse Creek in its initial brief, is that the evidence supporting the Commission's decision must 
be "substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the 
body of evidence opposed to the [agency's] view"80 As noted in Grouse Creek's initial brief, 
77 
78 
79 
80 
Pinehaven v. Brooks, 138 Idaho at 829, 70 P.3d at 667. 
R. p. 358. 
Idaho PUC Brief, p. 38 (emphasis added). 
Idaho State Ins. Fundv. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 260, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985). 
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there was an absolute failure by the Commission to weigh and discuss this compelling "evidence 
opposed" to the Commission's view. 
4. The Grouse Creek PP As are Not Contrary to the Public Interest. Idaho 
Power argues that the rates contained in the Grouse Creek PP As were contrary to the public 
interest. In postulating this argument Idaho Power takes unwarranted liberty with the 
administrative record in this case, referencing other Idaho PUC cases and arguments it may have 
made in those cases, that are not before this Court in this proceeding.81 For that reason alone, 
this Court should ignore those arguments. 
More specifically, this 'public interest' argument is simply a sub-set of the dispute 
involving whether Grouse Creek was, or was not eligible, for published avoided cost rates where 
eligibility (for Grouse Creek), changed on December 14, 2010. As of December 13, 2010, those 
published avoided cost rates, by very definition under PURP A, were in the public interest and it 
was in the public interest for Grouse Creek to claim those rates. After the date of change, the 
same rates were still in the public interest, but wind projects larger than 100 kw no longer 
qualified for them. 
On the other hand, if Idaho Power is arguing that the rates contained in the Grouse Creek 
PP As were not in the public interest for wind projects greater than 100 kw as of December 13, 
2010, or before, that issue has long been settled. In American Paper Institute, Inc. v. American 
Elec. Power Service Corp the United States Supreme Court ruled unanimously that FERC's 
81 See e.g., p. 32 of Idaho Power's Brief "Grouse Creek's agreements were not called for in Idaho 
Power's IRP, where not procured utilizing a request for proposal process, nor by any other means 
designed and required by the Commission to assure the least cost resources was acquired to meet the 
needs ofldaho Power's customers." 
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adoption of a rule requiring states to calculate QF rates at the utility's full avoided costs 
complied with PURPA's public interest requirement. 82 Consequently, Idaho Power's argument 
that the Grouse Creek PP A rates are not in the public interest can be put aside, as not especially 
relevant to issues before the Court in this case. 
5. Grouse Creek Did Pursue its Complaints via Remand Hearing. The 
Commission asserts that if Grouse Creek had wanted the Commission to weigh-in on whether 
Idaho Power had delayed or impeded contract negotiations, then Grouse Creek "should have 
pursued its complaints. But it did not."83 Consequently, the Idaho PUC admits that it did not 
consider Grouse Creek's evidence regarding (i) Grouse Creek's numerous identifications of the 
correct transmission provider, (ii) the location of the projects and (iii) the commercial operation 
date, "because they are not appropriate in the context of a proceeding where a negotiated contract 
is submitted for the Commission's review and approval."84 
The point missed by the Commission in making this argument is that the entire process 
on Remand from this Court -- to consider whether Grouse Creek had established facts sufficient 
to entitle it to legally enforceable obligations as per the FERC Cedar Creek standards -- was the 
equivalent of the process the Commission would have gone through, had it instead processed the 
Grouse Creek Complaints. In effect, the Remand process and hearing was in lieu of starting 
back up the complaint dockets. It is also quite similar to the Commission process implemented 
in the Cedar Creek remand case, which resulted in the Commission determining that Cedar 
82 American Paper Institute, Inc. v. American Elec. Power Service Corp., 103 S.Ct. 1921, 461 U.S. 
402 (1983). 
83 Id., p. 39. 
84 Idaho PUC Brief, p. 38. 
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Creek had established a legally enforceable obligation prior to December 14, 2010, even without 
filing and litigating a separate complaint proceeding. 85 
In its November 8, 2010 Complaints against Idaho Power, Grouse Creek alleged: (i) it 
had attempted to negotiate in good faith with Idaho Power for delivery of energy and capacity, 
(ii) it had committed itself to sell energy and capacity to Idaho Power, and as a consequence 
under PURP A, had also committed Idaho Power to buy the same, and (iii) "These commitments 
result[ed] in non-contractual, but binding, legally enforceable obligations" under PURPA.86 This 
is exactly the issue considered on Remand. Idaho Power framed the case similarly, as follows: 
We're here for the Commission to make findings, findings of fact relative to the 
legally enforceable obligation, which is the main topic of the Cedar Creek Order . 
. . . [I]t is this Commission, similar to a trial court, which is the finder of fact and 
which must make certain decisions - - and not FERC - - that are relevant to this 
case.
87 
The issues and arguments prosecuted by Grouse Creek and defended by Idaho Power in 
the remand case were identical to the issues raised by Grouse Creek's Complaints. Grouse Creek 
was of the understanding that the Idaho PUC would, in the remand case, factually evaluate 
whether Grouse Creek had established a legally enforceable obligation under the Cedar Creek 
standard, in conjunction with the Commission's numerous grandfathering decisions. As a 
85 Jn the Matter of. .. Cedar Creek Wind, IPUC Case Nos. PAC-E-11-01 through 05, Order No. 
32419. The difference between the Cedar Creek remand case and this remand case being that the parties 
in Cedar Creek (Cedar Creek Wind, Rocky Mountain Power and Idaho PUC Staff) negotiated a stipulated 
settlement which was approved by the Commission. 
86 See Grouse Creek Formal Complaint appended to Grouse Creek's Motion to Augment Agency 
Record, p. 6 of the Complaints. 
87 Tr. p. 7. 
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consequence, Grouse Creek provided 287 pages of evidence88 and submitted a comprehensive 
brief summarizing that factual evidence and the law. 89 Oral argument was also held. 
Instead of deciding the case based on the factual record, however, the Commission again 
rejected the Agreements primarily on yet another mechanical rule developed specifically for 
Grouse Creek (with the "effective date" substituting in for the "execution date" bright line rule). 
Only secondarily ("assuming arguendo ") did the Commission conclude that Grouse Creek had 
again faled to establish a legally enforceable obligation. In making this secondary ruling, the 
Idaho PUC only discussed and accepted Idaho Power's recitation of the evidence, while 
summarily rejecting all of Grouse Creek's evidence to the contrary,90 stating: "If Grouse Creek 
wanted the Commission to weigh in on whether Idaho Power acted in such a way as to delay or 
impede contract negotiations then Grouse Creek should have pursued its complaints."91 
Clearly, and as admitted by the Idaho PUC, the Commission's decision rejecting the 
Grouse Creek Agreements did not rest on substantial evidence as contained in the record, beyond 
the "four comers"92 and "effective dates"93 contained in those PP As. As discussed by Grouse 
Creek in its initial brief, such a failure is contrary to well established Idaho law.94 
88 Ex. pp. 3-279, Affidavit of Christine Mikell, In Support of Approval of the Energy Sales 
Agreements for Grouse Creek. 
89 R. p. 318. 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
See Grouse Creek's Initial Brief for a description of the factual evidence submitted, pp. 32 -36. 
Idaho PUC Brief, p. 39. 
Order No. 32635. R. p. 359. 
Id, R. pp. 357-362. 
Grouse Creek Initial Brief, pp. 37-39. 
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D. CORRECTING AF ACTUAL/LEGAL ASSERTION BY IDAHO POWER. 
Idaho Power's Statement of Fact says "As Grouse Creek is an off-system QF, Idaho 
Power's obligation to contract with the projects pursuant to PURP A does not arise until the 
projects demonstrate a firm delivery to a point on Idaho Power's system."95 Idaho Power points 
to no evidentiary or legal support for this claim that that a QF must sign or otherwise to commit 
itself to a transmission obligation, as a prerequisite to creating a legally enforceable obligation, 
and it therefore should be rejected.96 Idaho Power is also wrong in this factual assertion and the 
law could not be clearer and to the contrary: "Any electric utility to which such energy or 
capacity is transmitted shall purchase such energy or capacity under this subpart as if the 
qualifying facility were supplying energy or capacity directly to such electric utility."97 
Unfortunately, the primary factual reason this case exists at all relates to the months of 
delay cause by Idaho Power regarding this very point.98 Idaho Power has, continually, 
incorrectly, asserted that it had the right to refuse to sign a PP A with Grouse Creek, until Grouse 
Creek secured its transmission delivery to Idaho Power. Yet, after months of delays related to 
this transmission issue, Idaho Power itself waived this requirement and on December 2, 2010, 
sent draft PP As to Grouse Creek that simply required Grouse Creek to secure transmission 
95 
96 
Idaho Power Brief, p. 7, with no citation to support this statement of law. 
See Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho 372, 374, 234 P.3d 696, 698 (2010). 
97 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(d), "Transmitting to other electric utilities. If a qualifying facility agrees, an 
electric utility [i.e., Raft River Electric] which would otherwise be obligation to purchase energy or 
capacity from such a qualifying facility may transmit the energy or capacity to any other electric utility. 
Any electric utility to which such energy or capacity is transmitted shall purchase such energy or 
capacity under this subpart as if the qualifying facility were supplying energy or capacity directly to such 
electric utility." 
98 See Grouse Creek's Initial Brief, pp. l 0- 13. 
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rights prior to delivering energy, not prior to executing the PPAs.99 The record also reflects that 
the transmission related delay was not related to Grouse Creek's rational reluctance to 
contractually commit to long-term a take-and-pay transmission agreement until Idaho Power 
committed to the PP As, and the PP As were approved by the Commission. 100 
Idaho Power also incorrectly asserts that this transmission information was "missing 
information required for completion of the draft FESAs."101 Neither was the transmission 
information "missing" (see Grouse Creek's brief for a description of the seven times it was 
correctly provided to Idaho Power102), nor was it a legal prerequisite to Idaho Power's obligation 
to purchase Grouse Creek's QF energy. Yet, this is the very finding of the Idaho Commission 
that is in error, when, "assuming arguendo" it determined that PP A negotiations were still "in a 
state of flux," because Idaho Power requested confirmation from Grouse Creek, on 
December 14, 2010, as to the transmitting entity. 
E. ATTORNEYS FEES. 
Idaho Power and the Idaho PUC object to Grouse Creek's request for attorney fees, 
should Grouse Creek prevail in this appeal, on the basis that attorney fees are not available under 
99 Executed PP As at Arts. 4.1.7, 5.7, and 9; R. pp. 31, 34, 19-20; see also Mikell Affidavit Exhibit K 
, R. p. 167 (containing Grouse Creek's December 2, 2010 letter confirming a telephone conversation on 
that date that Idaho Power had finally agreed to waive the previous requirement that Grouse Creek 
complete transmission processes prior to PPA execution), and Mikell Affidavit Exhibit K, R. pp. 180, 182 
(containing the prior section 5. 7(f) of the PPA where Idaho Power required prior to PPA execution that 
Grouse Creek secure transmission agreements prior). 
100 Mikell Affidavit at~~ 31-33, 81; R. pp. 8, 9, 18. 
JOI 
102 
Idaho Power Brief at p. 9, citing Ex. p. 286. 
Grouse Creek Initial Brief, pp. 33, 34. 
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I.C. § 12-121 from an order of the Commission. Both parties cite Eagle Water Co. v. Idaho 
Public Utilities Commission103 as support for this denial. 
Grouse Creek concedes that as a general rule, attorney fees are not appropriate in appeals 
from Commission rulings. However, the Court's reasoning in Eagle Water, and the lineage of 
cases cited by the Court in Eagle Water (see e.g., Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Idaho Department 
of Employment104), are that attorney fees are not appropriate "because this type of case is not 
commenced by a complaint filed in a court action as required by LC.§ 12-121."105 
To the extent this Court concurs with Grouse Creek's argument above, that the Remand 
Hearing conducted by the Commission was in lieu of a hearing on the merits of the Grouse Creek 
Complaints, and Grouse Creek otherwise prevails in this appeal, then this Court is within its 
power to award attorney fees to Grouse Creek. 
Respectfully submitted this 301h day of April, 2013. 
' 
?Ji hi~ 
RONALD L. WILLIAMS 
Williams Bradbury, P.C. 
Attorneys for Grouse Creek 
103 Eagle Water Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 130 Idaho 314, 940 P.2d 1133 (1997). 
104 Northwest Pipeline Corporation v. Idaho Department of Employment, 129 Idaho 548, 928 P. 2d 
898 (1996). 
105 130 Idaho at 318, 940 P.2d at 1137. 
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